by Lope Coles Robredillo, SThD
IN THEORY, it is taught that in governance, all power derives from the people and the goal of politics is the common good. Because, by themselves,
individuals, families and groups, cannot achieve full development in
order to live a truly human life, it is the task of politics to make
available to them the necessary material, cultural, moral and spiritual
goods. Consequently, office
holders are placed in power by the people not only to reconcile the
particular goods of groups and individuals, but also to interpret common
goods according to the guidelines of the majority and the effective
good of all people. In view of
the enormity of this responsibility, one cannot but admire
politicians—those who choose to undertake the heavy burden of this task.
Politics: A Struggle for Power among the Elite
But
if the Philippine experience has anything to tell us, it is that
politics is essentially a power game, played by a few elite, that hardly
makes any marked improvement in the lives of the poor, since the common
good is scarcely its goal. Of
course, one can object that this is a generalization, and to generalize
is to falsify, but still, it provides us a pattern, a framework, and a
certain viewpoint to understand its workings. It does not, it is to be admitted, offer the whole truth— which is beyond the capacity of an essay as short as this—but it has something truthful to say.
Who play the game? Philippine politics, especially in the national scene, is almost exclusive of the few who are rich, or their agents. Historically,
the landowning class dominated politics before World War II, but partly
because of the development of commerce and industry, the class of big
businessmen and industrialists replaced it after the war. When
Ferdinand Marcos ran the country through martial law, he replaced the
post-war wealthy class with his own, but after EDSA I, the post-war
elite repositioned themselves within the ruling class.
Philippine politics is thus a game of the elite. But
it is elitist both because those who play it are the few who are rich,
and also because it has historically denied the active participation by
the poor in the highest decision-making bodies. Probably
not a single person who occupied a chair in the senate or in the house
has been known to be poor, even if political aspirants tended to
identify themselves with the poor. Diosdado Macapagal, I recall, was known as “the poor boy from Lubao.” Joseph Estrada was perceived to be poor, and made “Erap para sa mahirap” his campaign slogan.
Of
course, one might today point to the existence of the party-list system
that the post-Marcos constitution instituted, but as the Inquirer editorial (Apr 2, 2007)
noted, the mechanism remains imperfect, even though it is impressive:
“impressive because it seeks to imbed representatives of the poor and
the marginalized in Congress, which remains a bastion of the rich and
privileged; imperfect, because party-list nominees sometimes turn out to
be as privileged and well-connected as any traditional politician.” Indeed, some of these party-list representatives are connected with the entrenched oligarchy.
A case in point is the first three nominees of the Ahon Pinoy,
a party-list group newly accredited by the Comelec, which seeks to
represent overseas Filipino workers most of whom are really poor and
marginalized. These nominees,
according to the editorial, “are not OFWs, and cannot by any stretch of
imagination be considered underprivileged”: Ernesto Herrera III is a son
of a labor leader and former senator, Bernardo Ople is a brother of a
late labor secretary, senator and foreign secretary, and Dante Francis
Ang is a son of a publisher and close Arroyo ally. Thus, even what is intended for the underprivileged could be circumvented and used to place the elite in power.
In this game, it is the elite that vie for power among themselves. In
a way, our politics could be described as a struggle for power among
the rich and privileged who are more concerned with their own advantage
and that of their own class than with the advantage of the majority who
are poor. If it is not self-interest of the elite that guides politics, history and the present experience do not bear it out. As
Juan Sumulong is quoted to have said, the “majority and minority
parties represent almost exclusively the intelligentsia and what we call
the Philippine plutocracy, and that the needy classes have no
representation in these parties and for this reason have no voice nor
vote, even only as minorities, in the formulation of government
policies.”
Power, Aggrandizement and the Beneficiaries
Why this vying for political power? Probably
no one might say it explicitly, but it appears that political power
gives the elite opportunities to increase their wealth. Indeed, to capture political power is to self-aggrandize. As
Claro M. Recto observed as early as 1958, “ours is essentially a
pragmatic and a very simple [political education]. It boils down to
opportunism through public office… All the political offices [that is, from president to municipal mayor, from senator to municipal councilor, etc.] are the open sesame
to wealth and influence… It is because of this political education that
we have… the elite of officials who, after several years of holding
public office… have been able to build from nothing handsome fortunes of
varying magnitude on the opportunities afforded by the offices they
held.”
Political power, in other words, is convertible to economic power. As
President Diosdado Macapagal once noted, the president and the members
of congress have powers that are “so vast and potent that economic
interests enter into a mutually protective alliance with them which
results in a concentration of economic benefits in their combined
hands.”
But
after having built a handsome fortune by occupying the seat of power,
it would be almost impossible for the elite to part with it. On the contrary, they are there to protect their own interest. This partly explains why equitable distribution of wealth is almost impossible under a politics of power. A case in point is land reform. Since
the Commonwealth, there have been various government efforts to address
the problem of unrest through land reform legislation—Government Acts
Nos. 538 and 539 in 1940, Republic Act Nos. 1267 and 1400 in 1954 and
1955, and R.A. No. 3844 in 1963, R.A. Nos. 6380 and 6389 and Pres. Decree 27 under Marcos, and R.A. 6657 in 1988 under Aquino. But
as Pedro Salgado observes, “all these laws never solved landlessness,
for they were never intended to solve the problem in the first place. Congress is peopled by landlords. The
legislature thus saw to it that there would be loopholes in the law in
order that they and their fellow landlords can escape the law’s
provisions.”
The land reform code of 1963 under Macapagal provides a good sample. The
legal loopholes favorable to landlords include the exemption of lands
producing for export which of course were the big plantations, exemption
of fishponds, saltbeds and lands planted to citrus, cacao and other
permanent trees, and exemption of landholdings converted to residential,
commercial, industrial and other non-agricultural purposes, Though
the program was estimated to cost about P200 M within a year of its
enactment and P300 M in the next three years to be successful, Congress
allotted only about P1 M for its implementation. The
lesson is: democratization of wealth, which was one of the centerpieces
of Marcos’ New Society, is hardly possible under an elitist politics.
Politics, viewed from our historical experience, appears not to be intended for the benefit of the majority who are poor. Indalecio Soliongco, in one of his columns in the Manila Chronicle,
is not far removed from the reality when he compares politics to the
IUD (intra-uterine device): “Politics in the Philippines is as involuted
as an intra-uterine device, and its purpose, as the experience of the
years has shown, is to prevent the conception of ideas or the
realization of projects that will benefit the masses. This
is why, again, like the operation of the intra-uterine device,
Philippine politics works in a secret but rather effective way of
accomplishing what it is intended for it to accomplish.”
It
would seem, then, that if the elite that control the government do
something that benefits the poor, it is, one can make an educated guess,
because it coincides with their own interest. Nevertheless, all that is done does not go deeply enough to the fundamental problems of poverty. The benefits seem to be superficial. Probably,
among the candidates in our political history, no one has ever stirred
hope among the poor more deeply than Joseph Estrada, not only because
the hoi polloi perceived him to be one with them, but also because his
slogan was pro-poor: Erap para sa mahirap. He really enjoyed the support of the masses. But as Arsenio Balisacan, in his article, “Did the Estrada Administration Benefit the Poor?” in Doronila’s Between Fires, his term ended with a year that witnessed a deterioration of conditions for many of the poor.
How power brings opportunities to wealth is probably a given in our politics. One
who was glued to the TV during the impeachment trial of Estrada would
recall that the prosecution presented witnesses and evidence on the
former president’s involvement in illegal gambling and his maintenance
of secret bank accounts, although his defense panel denied these
allegations. It was also
reported that when Marcos fled the country, the US Customs agents found
suitcases of gold bricks and diamond jewelry. It is also alleged that they had certificates for gold bullion valued at billions of dollars. Imelda,
of course, pointed out that his husband was already rich even before he
became president, because he was already engaged in gold bars business.
The use of public office for self-aggrandizement brings with it graft and corruption. Says David Timberman in his book, A Changeless Land:
“The use of public office for personal or highly particularistic
purposes causes recurring cycles of scandal or alleged scandal at every
level of government. The
political ‘outs’ charge the ‘ins’ with corruption and abuse of power,
only to have the same charges leveled at them if and when they take
office. Indeed, it is a paradox
of Philippine politics that corruption is assumed to be endemic to
politics and government, but at the same time ‘exposing’ corruption is a
time-tested political tactic and guaranteed vote-getter. The
prevalence of corruption is a serious problem, but perhaps eve more
serious is the widespread presumption that corruption is unavoidable. This
perpetuates the problem, reduces the credibility of political leaders
and most importantly undermines the legitimacy of political
institutions.”
In her book, Christianity Versus Corruption,
Miriam Defensor Santiago presents a corruption case study in our
country, and goes over various corruption scandals: P35.7 B laundered
money scandal, P200 B national debt scandal, P60 B oil firms tax credit
scam, P25 B IMPSA power contract scandal, P20 B IMPSA power contract
midnight deal, P9.2 B centennial exposition public works scandal, P7.5 B
congressional initiative allocation scandal, to mention a few in her
enumeration. And yet, one
wonders whether, in our history since pre-war politics, there has been a
single high official from senator to president convicted of graft and
corruption. That these seem to
cease to scandalize, still less ignite public outrage simply indicates
that people expect leaders to be corrupt. Indeed,
although politicians are wont to level charges of corruption against
their opponents come election period, yet there has hardly been any
record of taking their accusation seriously to the point of bringing
them court, most likely because it would undermine the oligarchic class,
affecting many people, and because the issue would be divisive.
What about plunder? Plunder
is simply a logical consequence of power politics for
self-aggrandizement and power perpetuation. One is tempted to think that
some of the elite assume the idea, like the kings of the old Europe did, that everything in their kingdom in a way belongs to them. It
seems difficult to really distinguish what belongs to the government
and what belongs to the ruling elite; otherwise, plunder would not be
possible. In our political history, two presidents have been accused of plunder: Marcos and Estrada. According to Amando Doronila, in his book, The Fall of Joseph Estrada,
“as indicated by the evidence introduced during the impeachment trial
and that collected by the successor president to back criminal charges
of corruption and plunder, the deposed president allegedly amassed at
least P10 billion in cash and other assets within two and a half years. If these charges were true, Estrada would rival the scale of Marcos’ own plunder. At the time of his flight to Hawaii in 1986, Marcos’ assets were estimated at US$10 billion.”
Elections as Tool to Gain and Preserve Power
If
politics is viewed as politics of power, elections must be seen not
just as a political exercise in which people choose those who will hold
public office. Rather, they constitute a struggle among the elite to capture the power of the state. Elections,
in other words, are a form of war in which opposing wealthy individuals
seek to place themselves in a political advantage. Elections thus resolve the question as to who among the elite should have control over the country’s wealth and resources.
Today’s
conduct of elections has reinforced the elite’s control of the wealth
and resources because it costs a fortune to be elected to government
positions. Since only the
moneyed can afford to buy votes, give substantial donations, provide
entertainment, engage in nationwide campaign, bribe officials, and use
other means, fair or foul, it is logical why only the elite can run for
public office. Many towns
suffer a dearth of candidates, not because no one is intellectually
qualified, but because few have the capacity to finance their candidacy. So, even at the local level, governance is becoming dominated by the local elite. Elections
are therefore not opportunities for people to choose the best who can
govern them, but not infrequently to choose who among the elite will
have access to power. The result is that, elections have become an instrument for the continued dominance of the elite.
Equally important, elections also function as a legitimization of that dominance, even if it is less than just. To
lend credibility to his martial law regime that has been under attack
from foreign observers and to appease restive citizens, Marcos allowed
elections to be held in 1978. The result, which was condemned by the opposition as fraudulent, legitimized the Marcosian dominance, since his party, Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), won 151 out of 161 seats. To
legitimize his long tenure in office as president, Marcos called for
presidential elections in 1981, in which he won by a margin of over 16 M
votes or 91.4% against Alejo Santos of the Nationalista Party who got
8.6% only. Of course, the
largest opposition party at that time, Ninoy Aquino’s Laban, seeing
through the farce, did not field any candidate.
At the same time, it is needless to say that the conduct of elections practically disenfranchises the poor. While
it is true that theoretically, a poor man can run for president or
senator, in practice, only the rich have the capacity to do so, for
reasons we have noted above.
Political parties have a somewhat parallel function. Because the primary intent is to gain power, it is not surprising that political parties in the Philippines are merely nominal. In
theory, political parties are organized in order to direct the policies
of the government; therefore, they should have a coherent ideology and
programs that concretize it. In
the country, however, these parties do not have distinctive ideologies
and programs, for they serve as vehicles of factional and personal
ambition—to capture power. They have no coherent philosophy. It is difficult to see how the Partido Nationalista ng Pilipinas of Blas Ople is ideologically different from the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan that Nicano Iñiguez tried to reorganize. Consequently, once one is not nominated in the party he is affiliated with, it can happen that he will organize his own.
One’s party affiliation hardly indicates the ideology and principles that he believes in. No
wonder, a politician easily changes his political allegiance on the
pragmatic basis of whether or not his party can help him achieve his
ambition or not. Though Marcos
was a member of the Liberal Party for a long time, he joined the
Nationalista Party when his original party nominated the incumbent
president Diosdado Macapagal for re-election. If
the phenomenon of allegiance switching remains a political practice to
date, it is also partly because people generally never give damn about
it. What is of prime importance
to them is not whether a particular candidate makes important stand on
issue of concern to the nation, but whether he can provide gifts,
employment, funds and other benefits.
Because our political parties lacked substance, no wonder politics degenerated into a politics of personalities. “This is a system,” goes the CBCP Catechism on the Church and Politics, “where popularity of political candidates rather than issues count more than knowledge and competence. The
popularity of personalities, and the ‘connection’ of personalities to
the powers that be are more often than not the main criteria for judging
who should be elected. Thus,
candidates for public office who are popular in movies, sports or are
connected to powerful political families have significant headstart in
elections.”
Once
ensconced in the seat of power, one expects that politicians would
begin not only to recover the expenses incurred during the elections but
also to accumulate more wealth. Understandably
enough, it would be too much to expect that congressmen, for instance,
would take position on the basis of party principles. Politics becomes one of pay-offs. In
2000, Luis Chavit Singzon, governor of Ilocos Sur, alleged that he had
personally given Joseph Estrada P400 M as pay-off from illegal gambling
profits, and P180 M from the government price subsidy for the tobacco
farmers’ marketing cooperative. According to Jovito Salonga, author of Presidential Plunder: the Quest for the Marcos Ill-Gotten Wealth, and Belinda Aquino, author of The Politics of Plunder, Marcos created monopolies and placed them under the control of his cronies, his families becoming owners of big corporations, laundered money, and extracted kickbacks, among others. Not so long ago, the Swiss government returned US$684 M in allegedly ill-gotten Marcos wealth.
Instrument of Elite Dominance and Power Perpetuation
If
monopolies are distributed among cronies, it is because, in order to
survive and perpetuate themselves in power, the elite must share the
benefits of power with their own trusted men. Which is why, ours has
been described as politics of patronage. Says the CBCP Catechism:
“Derived from the feudal system of master and servant, the politics of
patronage considers the relationship between public servant and ordinary
citizen as that of patron (master) and client (servant). Rewards or benefits are distributed according to the loyalty of clients to their patrons. Clients
or voters depend on their patron or public officials for every
development project or assistance, and solutions to community problems. Rewards
or development projects are distributed, then, on the basis not of
justice due to people but on the basis of the government official’s
‘kindness’ and the loyalty of the people to the public official. Thus political leaders and followers who show support are rewarded with projects, money or jobs. Dependence and subservience, passivity and inaction on the part of citizens is characteristic of such a system. This
accounts for the lack of viable organizations among the poor on the one
hand, and the concentration of wealth on the other.”
Patronage politics helps the well-entrenched elite perpetuate themselves in office in three ways. First, people are so placed in debt that they have to pay in votes come election time. Second,
a network of political relations is built and expanded within their
political turf and becomes a machinery to assure victory. Third,
it divides people into those who are loyal and those who are not, the
better for the politicians to forestall any move by the clients to
independently organize themselves into a powerful body.
Pork
Barrel, which is part of patronage politics, is one of the instruments
of power perpetuation, though, admittedly, it has other uses. In the Philippines,
probably because of its not so edifying connotations, it came under
different brands—Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) and Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). At present, each senator gets P200 M in pork barrel allocations, while each congressman receives P65 M. Those
who benefit from it naturally continue to be indebted to the
politician, and therefore could be counted upon for votes in the next
elections. It thus serves as an instrument to secure support from the constituents and their loyalty to him. During martial law, Marcos was generous with the pork barrel allotment to the assemblymen to shore up his regime.
Having
stayed long in office, some politicians seem to have developed a stance
that treats public office as a family title that could be passed on
from one generation to the next, That is to say, political power is
perpetuated through family dynasty. One
is led to conclude that the office practically becomes a family asset
that protects its own business and other interests and shields it from
political jeopardy. This
probably explains why through generations we are familiar with surnames
associated with politics, because they come up in almost every election
period. Some of these well-known names may be mentioned: Aquinos—Benigno, Sr, Benigno Jr, Noynoy, Tessie, and Herminio. Osmeñas—Sergio Sr, Sergio Jr, Lito, Sergio III. Estradas-—Joseph, Loi, Jinggoy, JV, Emilio Ramon. Marcoses—Ferdinand, Imelda, Ferdinand Jr, Imee. Not
so long ago, Francisco Tatad resigned from the opposition because of
principles associated with the phenomenon of political dynasty. Of
course, Tatad’s arguments based, among others, on the spirit of the
Constitution were sound, but the elite would hear none of it. Anyway,
what happens is that the longer the politicians stay, the more
entrenched they become, and the more difficult they are to remove.
Disenfranchisement of the Poor
Because
politics is meant for the continued dominance of the elite, the wealthy
never really work for what could fundamentally better the lot of the
poor. For one thing, they seem to think that what is good for them is also good for the constituents. If
one may not admit that the ruling elite are deliberately blind to the
needs of the poor, one has to say that they have a narrow worldview. As
Miriam Defensor Santiago puts it, “the biggest problem in our culture
is that many among the Metro Manila rich identify their selfish private
interests with the general interests of the public; and their narrow
social values, with national values. The rich think that what is good for them is necessarily good for the country. This is the root cause of massive poverty in the Third World. Over
the decades, the rich have succeeded in identifying their own social
organization with the peace and order of society in general. Because of this worldview, the rich consider themselves the apostles of law and order. They support reform, but never a meaningful, even if peaceful, revolution. They will support reform as long as they remain rich, and the poor remain where they are. Their kind of reform is not only incremental, but also self-interested. Their obsession with peace is tied to their privileges under the status quo. This is why the rich must assume responsibility for widespread poverty.”
Indeed, as we have already seen, the poor are removed from the center of power. In fact, those whose interest lies outside what the elite consider as the true good of the state are removed from it. One easily recalls the plebiscite of 1947. To
give parity rights to the Americans to the exploitation and development
of our natural resources, the Constitution had to be amended. But
with the presence in Congress of Luis Taruc and other congressmen who
ran and won in the 1946 elections under the Democratic Alliance, and who
opposed the proposal on nationalist grounds, it was feared that the
parity rights bill might not get the required 2/3 votes. Congress passed a resolution to remove them from the legislature on the ground of election frauds and terrorism!
Indeed,
even party-list mechanism, which was crafted into the 1987 Constitution
with good intentions, could be used to advance the cause of the
dominant power. Though the principle behind the system is lofty, “it has been used, often enough,” says a PDI editorial (Apr 3, 07), “to smuggle political players into Congress, through the party-list backdoor. If
Akbayan party-list Rep. Etta Rosales is correct, the Arroyo
administration is now in the middle of an attempt to smuggle in its own
party-list representative through that same door. Last
week, she charged that the Comelec had accredited at least 11 suspect
party-list groups, with varying degrees of connection to Malacañang or
Palace officials…. The object is clear: The administration has seen the
potent role played by a bloc of like-minded party-list representatives
in both attempts to impeach the President. Now, it wants to fill the party-list seats with friendly bodies.”
In
such a politics where the disenfranchised do not participate in the
major decisions of the government, is it any wonder that we have
insurgency problem? As Jose Almonte says in his article, “Political Turmoil in the Philippines,” “dissident groups have no resort other than force in their effort to bridge the social cleavages in national society. Hence,
the Philippines has the distinction of hosting East Asia’s
longest-running communist insurgency—as well as separatist movements
among our Muslim communities, and, more recently, a series of mutinies
by the middle ranks of the officer corps.” Viewed in this context, it would a fortiori not be enough to solve insurgency by merely fighting against it through arms.
Politics in the Philippines: A History of Power Transfer
It
appears that Philippine politics is by and large a history of transfer
of political power from one set of elite families to another, or within
the same class. From 1946 to
1968, political powers changed hands largely between the two parties—the
Liberals and the Nationalistas, which were both peopled by wealthy
individuals. Neither of the two
parties made any fundamental changes in the system, even though the
party in power was always accused by the other of not giving the people a
better deal. In the 1970s,
Marcos declared martial law to destroy the oligarchic structure of
society, but he ended up with “crony capitalism” by distributing
monopolies to his own cronies. When
Marcos fell from power in 1986, the elite that were removed from the
center of power and privilege were restored and repositioned and
continued the same elite politics.
Now,
in the 2007 elections, we principally have Genuine Opposition vs. Team
Unity, but from the point of view of principles and outlook, one has
difficulty in finding their marked differences, except in terms of
personalities. It is simply a
power struggle between two elite groups vying for power, pro-GMA and
anti-GMA, but their agenda do not bear fundamental differences. Of
course, seasons, personalities and names in our political history
change, but the system that the elite ruling class had installed before
the war remains the same. The majority, on the other hand, remains mired in poverty and alienated from the center of power and domination. “The
thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done
is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the sun” (Ecc 1:8). [February 18, 2008]
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